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Abstract 
Krynicki, M. and M. Mostowski, Decidability problems in languages with Henkin quantifiers, 
Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 58 (1992) 149-172. 
We consider the language L(H,) with all Henkin quantifiers H, defined as follows: 
H,,x,...x,y,.~.y, 4(x,,..., x,, Y,, . , Y,) iff 3f, . . .f, Vxx, . . .x, 9(x,, . . ,x,, f,(xA 
. , f,(x,)). We show that the theory of equality in L(H,) is undecidable. The proof of this 
result goes by interpretation of the word problem for semigroups. 
Henkin quantifiers are strictly related to the function quantifiers F, defined as follows: 
F,x, . ..x.Y,...Y, ~(~,,...,x,,Y,,...,Y,) iff 3fW...x, +(x,,...,x,, f(x,),...,f(x,)). 
In contrast with the first result we show that the theory of equality with all quantifiers F, is 
decidable. 
We also consider decidability problems for other theories in languages L(F,) and L(H,). 
1. Introduction 
1.1. Introductory remarks 
The quantifier is one of the crucial concepts in modern logic. However, for a 
long time the only quantifiers considered were the existential (3) and universal 
(V) ones. The first general concept of a quantifier was proposed by Andrzej 
Mostowski, later generalized by P. Lindstrom. Both definitions accept as 
quantifiers a lot of concepts which we are accustomed to treat in a very different 
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way. Probably one of the most natural concepts of quantifier not covered by 
traditional theory was suggested by L. Henkin. 
Henkin [6] proposed to consider a language with quantifiers arising from 
existential and universal quantifiers by writing them down in some orderings (i.e., 
dense ordering, partial ordering etc.). He called them dependent quantifiers. As 
simplest example, he considered a quantifier H bounding four variables in a 
formula. A formula # built up using H can be written as: 
Its semantical meaning can be explained as If, g Vx, y $(x, y, fx, gy). It was 
proved (see Henkin [6]) by Ehrenfeucht that the logic L(H) is essentially stronger 
than first-order logic and the set of tautologies of L(H) is not recursively 
enumerable. About ten years later Enderton [5] and Walkoe [16] considered logic 
with quantifiers proposed by Henkin but bounding finitely many variables only. 
They call them ‘finitely partially ordered quantifiers’ (f.p.0.q.). Instead of this 
name we shall use the term ‘Henkin quantifiers’. In the literature also the names 
‘branched quantifiers’ or, in a little broader sense, ‘branching quantifiers’ are 
used. 
After the two eminent results of Godel that elementary logic is recursively 
enumerable and that no theory rich enough to contain arithmetic could be 
recursively enumerable, and Church’s theorem that elementary logic is not 
decidable, we have two important borderlines dividing logics and theories into 
three classes: 
1. decidable, 
2. undecidable but recursively axiomatizable, 
3. not recursively axiomatizable. 
Traditionally the majority of efforts were devoted to identifying the borderline 
between decidable and undecidable. However, the second borderline seems also 
to be very important. A recursively enumerable theory can be axiomatized in a 
standard way, hence its set of theorems can be defined by proof-theoretical 
means only, not referring to any semantical description. 
The main purpose of this paper is to draw as accurate as possible the borderline 
between decidable and undecidable theories in languages with Henkin 
quantifiers. 
We state two theorems contrasting undecidability of some simple fragment of 
logic with empty signature in a language with Henkin quantifiers on the one 
hand, with decidability of a similar fragment with function quantifiers, being 
apparently an inessential weakening of Henkin quantifiers, on the other hand. 
Researches and results presented in this paper are strictly related to those from 
Krynicki-Lachlan [9], where some rough borderlines between decidable and 
undecidable fragments of L(H) were drawn. Here we give a more detailed 
description of this borderline, from two sides-positive and negative-f de- 
cidability cases. 
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The main part of this paper is divided into two parts (Sections 2 and 3). In 
Section 2 the theory of equality is discussed. Section 3 is devoted to investigations 
of decidability problems for some theories of nonempty signature. 
1.2. Basic concepts 
Formally a Henkin quantifier prefix can be defined as Q = (Ae, E,, De), 
where A, and E, are disjoint sets of variables (universal and existential, 
respectively), and Do E A, X E, (De is a dependency relation, it says on which 
universal variables a given existential variable depends). Q bounds those 
variables which belong to A, U E,. We differentiate between quantifiers and 
quantifier prefixes as follows: a quantifier prefix is a quantifier with assigned 
concrete variables. For instance V is a quantifier, but Vx is a quantifier prefix. In 
this sense we have defined Henkin quantifier prefixes, not Henkin quantifiers. 
However, this definition can be modified in a natural way to apply it to Henkin 
quantifiers also. We will use a somewhat ambiguous notation and terminology not 
differentiating between quantifiers and quantifier prefixes if it will be safe enough. 
Semantics for Henkin quantifiers is given through translation into second-order 
logic. A formula Q@(x,, . . . , xn, y,, . . . , y,), where x,, . . . , x, are all universal 
variables of Q and yl, . . . , y,,, are all existential variables from Q, is translated 
into a formula 
% * * * 3fm vx, . . * vx, t($(x*, . . . , x,9 f&)2 . . . > fmGm))h 
where Xi is a sequence of variables being in relation D, with yi (or in other words 
on which yi depends). In what follows we will use a more intuitive notation 
introduced by Henkin. Instead of ({x, y}, {z, u}, {(x, z), (y, u)}) we shall write 
vx 32 
vy 324’ 
Even if not all Henkin quantifiers can be written in this more intuitive way, this is 
no problem since we shall consider here only quantifiers having such intuitive 
representations. 
We assume the following notation: Hf: is the quantifier 
vx,, . . * V-xlk BY, 
. . 
. :. 
vx,, * * * VGZk 3Y, 
By default k = 1, n =2-which means that H, is HA, and Hk is Hz, and in 
particular H is Hl (it is so-called the Henkin quantifier). By L(Hi) we mean the 
logic with Hfl as the only quantifier. L(H,) is the logic with all quantifiers H,. By 
L* we denote the logic with all Henkin quantifiers. 
In the paper by Walkoe [16] two important normal form characterizations for 
Henkin quantifiers were shown. He proved: 
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Theorem 1. For every Henkin quantifier prefix Q and every formula $J there are 
effectively found quantifier prefixes Q’ and Q” and quantifier-free formulae 
(Y, /3, a’, /I’, with identity as the only predicate such that Q$ and Q’(cx A (/I’+ 
c$)) are equivalent, and QC#J and Q”(cx’ A (p’ j $)) are equivalent in infinite 
models, where Q ’ is of the form 
VXl. * . VXk 3y, . . .3y, 
Vx;. . .Vxk3y;.*.3y; 
and Q” is of the form 
VXl vx; 3y, 
. . . . . . . . . 
It follows that using quantifiers of the form Q ’ we can define all Henkin 
quantifier prefixes. 
It is not known whether prefixes of the form Q” are sufficient without the 
restriction to infinite models, or if the semantical power of prefixes of the form H, 
is sufficient. 
The logic with Henkin quantifiers is stronger than that of elementary logic. The 
first known sentence with a Henkin quantifier not expressible in elementary logic 




It says that the universe is finite. Translated into second-order logic it says exactly 
what follows: it is not so that there is a one-one function and an object which is 
different from all values of this function. The equivalence (x = y e z = U) is used 
here to express two things: that two functions are identical (implication from left 
to right), and that this function is one-one (implication from right to left). It 
follows that the Ehrenfeucht statement can be expressed using a weaker 
quantifier, a so-called function quantifier. Function quantifiers were introduced in 
Krynicki [S] and studied in Krynicki-Vatinanen [lo]. The function quantifier F, 
binds 2n variables in one formula and its semantics is defined as follows 
(F,A - . .x,Y, . . -Y,)$(x~, . . . t x,, Y,, . . . > yn) 
iff 3f VxI . . * x, @(xl, . . . , x,, f (x,), . . . , f(x,)). 
It is known that L(F,) is a sublogic of L(H,). (F,x, . . .x,,y, * . . y,) @(xl, . . . , x,, 
y,, . . ., y,,) is equivalent to (H,xl.. *xnyl.. .Y,)(cK A @(x1, . . . , xnry,, . . . , y,)), 
where (Y is a conjunction of formulae (x, =xi + y, =yi) for i = 2, . . . , n. By 
L(F,) we denote the logic with all quantifiers F,. The concept of function 
quantifier can be generalized in a natural way. So Fk, is a function quantifier, 
where n is the number of tokens of the function used, and k is its arity (Ff: binds 
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k(n + 1) variables). Thus for instance 
(F;~,GYIYZZ,ZJ 44x1, ~2, ~1, ~29 ~1, ,721 
is equivalent to 
To compare logics we use the relation s defined as follows: L < L’ if and only 
if for every L-formula $ there is an L’-formula 111 such that for every structure of 
proper signature Vl: ‘u k @ if and only if ?J k $J. L = L’ if and only if L c L’ and 
L’ C L. 
We follow more or less the standard notation, as in Chang-Keisler [2]. By 
f”(a) we denote the result of n-fold application of f to a (i.e., f”(a) = a, 
f”+‘(a) =f(f”(a))). 
2. Theory of equality 
2.1. Firstsrder formulation of the word problem 
Let A* be the set of words over the alphabet A = {a, b}. The word problem 
for semigroups can be formulated as the decision problem for sentences of the 
form 
a!, =p1 A * * ’ A WI = Pn * a;t+1= hz+,t (1) 
where ai, pi E A* for i = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1. That is, as the problem of deciding if a 
sentence of the form (1) is true in every semigroup with two generators a, b. It is 
well known that this problem is undecidable. In Davis [3] this problem is 
formulated in a slightly more general way. The difference is that he allows any 
finite alphabet A. However, from an algorithmic point of view both formulations 
are equivalent. 
Let L be a first-order logic with identity and two unary function symbols f, g 
as only nonlogical constants. Let T[x] be the set of all terms of logic L with x as 
unique free variable. Let S be the set of all sentences of the form: 
vx @r(x) = t1(x)) A * * * A v.x (&(X) = tn(x)) * v.x (&z+,(x) = tn+l(x)), (2) 
where s;(x), t;(x) E T[x] for i = 1, 2, . . . , n + 1. 
By the tautology problem for the set S we mean the problem of deciding if a 
given sentence belonging to the set S is true in every model for L. 
Lemma 1. The tautology problem for the set S is undecidable. 
Proof. We shall show that the word problem can be recursively reduced to the 
decision problem for the set S. 
Let us observe that there is a one-one effective correspondence ~1 between the 
set A* and T[x] such that P(E) = x (E is the empty word) and for (Y E A*, 
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la4 =fM4) and p(k) = g@(a)). Each model ‘?I = (X, F, G) for L 
determines a semigroup H of mappings from X to X generated by F and G. 
Moreover, for any semigroup H with two generators there is a model ‘3 for L 
such that for every (Y, /3 E A* we have: 
(Y = /3 is true in H if and only if 5!l k Vx (~(a) = p(p)). 
Then the implication (1) is true in every semigroup with two generators exactly 
when the sentence: 
V.x (44 = P(P1)) A * . . A vx M%) = PcL(Pn)) * v.x (P(G+1) = Pu-L+1)) 
is true in every model for L. Cl 
Let W be the set of all sentences of the logic L of the form Vx By, . . . By, @, 
where 4 is a boolean combination of formulae of the form f(z) = u and g(z) = u, 
where z, u E {x, y,, . . . , y,}. 
Lemma 2. The tautology problem for W is undecidable. 
Proof. We are going to reduce the decision problem for S to that of W. Let us 
observe that the sentence (2) is equivalent to a sentence of the form Vx 3y @, 
where C$ is a quantifier-free formula. Then we can eliminate all complex terms 
from any quantifier-free formula 77 subsequently replacing r](f (s)) by 32 (z = s A 
q(f (z))), where z is a new variable not occurring in 17. In this way we effectively 
obtain a formula belonging to W and equivalent to (2). 0 
2.2. Undecidability of the theory of equality in L(H,) 
Let $ be a sentence of the form Vz, 32, . . .3z, t), where q is a boolean 
combination of formulae of the form f(z) = v and g(z) = v, where z, u E 
{ zo, z1, -. . 9 z,} (it means $ E W). By $* we denote the following sentence 
Vx, 3Y, 
. . . . . . 
32, vxm %n vz 1 ***vZn(I;“~A(X*?‘))~ 
vu, 3lJl 
. . . . . . 
VUk 3Uk 
(3) 
where 5‘ is the conjunction (x1 = x2 3 y, = y2) A . . . A (x, =x, 3 y, = y,), 5 is the 
conjunction (ui = u2 * vi = v2) A . * . A (u, = uk 3 v1 = vk), q’ is the negation of 
the formula obtained from r/j by substitutions yi in place of the ith occurrence off 
in q, vi in place of the ith occurrence of g in ly, x is the conjunction of equalities 
xi = zj and Ui = 4, when the ith occurrence off in + is in a context f (zj), and the 
ith occurrence of g in I@ is in a context g(zj) (of course m and k are the numbers 
of occurrences in w off and g, respectively). 
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The described construction is very similar to that of Walkoe [16] and Enderton 
[5]. The point here is that to formulate t/~,’ we do not need all Henkin quantifiers 
but only the quantifiers H,. 
A semantical analysis of sentences 4 and $* proves the following. 
Lemma 3. For every C$ E W, 1 $I if and only if l@* is universally valid. 
Let V be the set of sentences of the form lQ$, where Q is a Henkin quantifier 
prefix and $I is a purely logical (i.e., without nonlogical constants) quantifier-free 
formula. V, is the subset of formulae ~Qc#J from V such that Q is H, for some it. 
Lemma 4. The tautology problem for the set V is recursively enumerable. 
Proof. Let g E V. This means that C is of the form lQ@, where C$ is 
quantifier-free. Then we can translate 5‘ into a second-order statement in the 
usual way. Let VfI - - * Vfn II, be the second-order translation of lQ$. According 
to our assumption t& can be identified with a first-order formula when we treat the 
second-order variables fi, . . . , fn as nonlogical constants. Then we see that 5 is a 
tautology if and only if t/j is a first-order tautology. Then we obtain the claim by 
the recursive enumerability of the set of first-order tautologies. 0 
Theorem 2. The set of tautologies belonging to V, is recursively enumerable but 
not recursive, and consequently the theory of equality in L(H,) is undecidable. 
Proof. Recursive enumerability follows from Lemma 4. By Lemmas 2 and 3 the 
tautology problem for the set V, cannot be decidable. 0 
It does not follow that the theory of equality in L(H,) is axiomatizable (i.e., 
the set of its theorems is recursively enumerable). Let us notice that the 
implication (1) does not hold in all semigroups if and only if there is a semigroup 
of functions over an infinite set with two generators in which the implication (1) 
does not hold. Thus we have justified the following: 
Lemma 5. Let q~ E S. Then 1~ is consistent if and only if lv has an infinite model 
(of any infinite power by the Skolem-Liiwenheim Theorem). 
Let W- be the set of negations of formulae from W, that is, the set of 
sentences from logic L of the form 3x Vyi . * . Vyn @, where C#I is a boolean 
combination of formulae of the form f(z) = v and g(z) = v, where z, v E 
G, Y1> . * . 7 Yn>. 
Lemma 6. The problem whether q E W- has an infinite model is not recursively 
enumerable. 
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Proof. The reasoning is similar to that in the proof of Lemma 2. We use here the 
fact that the problem whether implication (1) does not hold in all semigroups is 
not recursively enumerable, being the complement of a recursively enumerable 
but not recursive problem. •! 
Let C$ E W-. We define 6 as the sentence (y J +*), where c$* is defined by (3) 
and y is Ehrenfeucht’s statement saying that there are finitely many entities. By 
semantical analysis of 4 we obtain the following: 
Lemma 7. For @ E W- we have: @ has an infinite model if and only if 4 is a 
tautology. 
Now we get the conclusion. 
Theorem 3. The theory of equality in L(H,) is neither decidable nor axiomatizable. 
Proof. By Lemmas 6, 7, the considered set has a recursively defined subset which 
is not recursively enumerable. By Theorem 2 it also has a recursively defined 
subset which is recusively enumerable but not recursive. •I 
2.3. Bifunctional quantifiers 
In the above reasoning justifying the last theorem we have used a fragment of 
the logic L(H,). This suggests us to introduce the quantifier F,., defined as 
follows 
F,,,x,...x,x;...x~y,...y,y;...yl,~(x,,...,y~) iff 
3fg vx, . . * .Ly1 . . . y, $(x1, . . . , x,, f(X,), . . . , f (&A, 
y,, *. . > Y?lP g(Y1)t * . . 9 g(y,)). 
We call this quantifier bifunctionaf quantijier. The logic with all bifunctional 
quantifiers will be denoted by L(F,,,). The following gives us the relations which 
hold between bifunctional and other quantifiers. 
Proposition. (a) If m s k and n s 1 or n s k and m c 1 then L(F,,,) =S L(Fk.1). 
(b) L(Fm) = L(FnA 
(c) L(F,,,) = LO-5 
(4 L(F,.,) s L(bn+n). 
(e) L(F,+,) = L(F,+d c L(FmJ 
(f) L(F,) c L(Fw,) =s LO-ho). 
As a corollary of our considerations we have: 
Theorem 4. The theory of equality in L(Fw,rU) is neither decidable nor 
axiomatizable. 
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2.4. The proof system LB 
In Mostowski [12] the proof system LB for logic with Henkin quantifiers is 
defined by two rules in natural deduction style LBl, LB2. It was proved that LB 
is complete with respect to the so-called weak semantics, defined by the class of 
structures (3, K), where %?l is a first-order structure, and K is a class of relations 
over 1’211 closed under definability in (3, K) by LB-formulae. Satisfiability is 
given through a translation t of LB-formulae into second-order formulae 
restricting second-order quantifiers to K. Thus 
t Q'ql ( > Q 
is defined as 3R, S E K (t(QR(Z)) A t(Q’S(j)) A VZ, jj (R(x) A S(y) j t(q))), 
where x and jj are sequences of all variables occurring in Q and Q’, respectively. 
Assuming the Axiom of Choice we obtain by removing the restriction to a class 
K, a semantics equivalent to that given by Henkin and assumed elsewhere in this 
paper. 
Of course the set of LB-tautologies is recursively enumerable, as is true of all 
finitary proof systems. However, we can justify an analogy of Theorem 2 for LB. 
For this we need the following: 
Lemma 8. For every $ E V, $ is a tautology if and only if $ is LB-provable. 
In Mostowski [14] there was proved a more general theorem for $ having only 
negative occurrences of quantifier prefixes. The idea of that proof is similar to 
that used in the proof of Lemma 4. 
By Theorem 2 and Lemma 8 we obtain the following: 
Theorem 5. The set of LB-tautologies belonging to r/;, is not recursive. 
2.5. A logic with one Henkin quantifier 
In Mostowski [13] the strongest known negative result concerning the de- 
cidability of the theory of equality in a language with fixed Henkin quantifier is 
stated. Unfortunately the formulation of the last theorem in that paper stating the 
relevant fact is incorrect. The correct formulation is as follows. 
Theorem 6. Let T be a self -consistent (i.e., iCONS is not provable in T), 
finitely axiomatizable extension of Godel-Bernays set theory. Then there is a 
Henkin quantifier Q such that for every algorithm A the set-theoretical statement 
expressing that “A is a decision algorithm for L(Q)” is not provable in T. 
The proof in Mostowski [13] gives a correct justification for this theorem. 
Furthermore the assumption about finite axiomatizability is not essential. 
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2.6. Decidability of the theory of equality in L(F,) 
In this section, in spite of the main result of Section 2.3, we are going to show 
that the theory of equality is decidable in the language L(F,). This result should 
be less surprising if we consider the following example. In Section 2.2 we 
have reduced the word problem to the tautology problem of sentences of the 
form ~H,,c#J where 4 is a first-order formula. Then we have concluded the 
undecidability of this problem. Now let us consider the class of sentences of the 
form lF,X # where I$ is a first-order formula. It follows from the Ehrenfeucht 
theorem [4] concerning decidability of the first-order theory of one unary function 
that the tautology problem for the last class of sentences is decidable. 
Now we start to prove our main result in this section. The proof will be done by 
the method of elimination of quantifiers, similar to that used in Krynicki-Lachlan 
[9]. Thus we will consider a formula F,x, . * * x, #, where C$ is a quantifier-free 
formula and we shall show that it can be equivalently replaced by some 
quantifier-free formula using some, so-called, basic sentences. To do this we shall 
classify all possible unary functions with respect to their properties expressed by 
quantifier-free formulas. Thus we will consider structure of the form 
‘?I = (A, al, . . . , a,, f ), (4) 
where al, . . . , a, E A, ai # aj for i #j and f is a function from A to A. We begin 
with defining a type of n elements of such a model. It describes all equality 
relations between given elements and their images in the function f. Next we will 
introduce the notion of l-basic type which describes possible neighbours of a 
given element in the graph of a function. This allows us to define the notion of 
code. A code is in some sense the ‘skeleton’ of a function-it contains all 
possible configurations of the graph of a given function. We will show that there 
are finitely many codes and that each function corresponds to some code. This 
allows us to consider only finitely many sorts of functions and to effectively 
determine these sorts of functions which satisfy a starting formula $. Finally, it 
suffices to associate with each code a suitable basic sentence which guarantees the 
existence of a function of a given sort. 
By a type of elements bl, . . . , b, EA in a structure 8, denoted by 
t”(bl, . . . , b,), we mean a pair (E, r]) where E is a function from the set 
{(i,j):O<i<js2n} into (0, l} such that 
e(i, j) = 0 if and only if bi = bj, 
and r,r is a function from the set (1, . . . ,2n} into (0, . . . , m} such that 
v(i) = 
r if bi=a,, 
0 ifbi#a,forr=l,...,m, 
where for i = 1, . . . , n we put b”+i = f (bi). 
Thus the type t"(bl, . . . , b,) describes the graph of the function f restricted to 
the elements bl, . . . , b,, f(b,), . . . , f (b,). Moreover, this description is com- 
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plete. It means that if two graphs are not isomorphic then their types are not the 
same (however, not conversely). Thus with each type t we can associate a 
unique, up to isomorphism, directed graph G,. Moreover, for each type t a 
quantifier-free formula c#&~, . . . , x,) can effectively be found such that for 
b 1,. . . 3 b, ~4 @,(b,> . . . , 6,) is true in ‘8 iff tY’(bI, . . . , b,) = t. 
A type t is called connected if G, is a connected graph (i.e., for all elements 
a, b of the graph there is a sequence a,, . . . , a, such that a, = a, a, = b and for all 
i=l,..., s - 1 there is an arrow from ui to Ui+r or from u,+~ to UJ. A type 
t = (E, 7) is called simple if for all i, j such that 0 < i < j s 2n we have: 
E(i,j)=O e j=n+i-1 A i>l 
and q(i) = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n (this describes the situation where b,+l =f(bi) and 
bi # bj for i # j). A type t = (E, q) is called ramifying if for some 1 =S i < j c n, 
~(1, it + i) = ~(1, IZ + j) = 0 and e(i, j) = 1. A type is called ramifying in the wider 
sense if in the graph G, there are distinct arrows having the same endpoints. A 
type t = (E, q) is called initial if for all i = 1, . . . , n, ~(1, n + i) = 1. 
By t(n, m) we denote the number of all types. In an obvious way we have 
t(n, m) S 2n(h-1)m2n. 
Finally we define 
TYP”(“Jl) = {t”‘(b*, . . . , b,): bl, . . . , b, E A}. 
Let D be a set. For d E D let d be the name of d. A basic formula on D is any 
formula of one of the following forms: 
f”(x)=f’(x) for OSl<sCn, 
f”(x)=f’(d) forOCs+l<n, 
3Y2 * . . Y, 4&(x, Y2> *. . , y,J for all connected t. 
The last sentence we will denote by 0,. 
A basic l-type on D is a set p of basic formulas on D or their negations such 
that: 
(i) for each basic formula @ on D either # or ~C#J is in p; 
(ii) p is realized in some structure of the form (4) in such a way that 
{al, . . . , u,}GDEA. 
A basic l-type on D containing a formula “x = d” is called trivial. A basic 
l-type containing a formula “I = d” for some s s n and d E D is called 
subtriviuf. A basic l-type containing for some s =S it a formula ‘f”(x) = x” is called 
cycle. A cycle is called r-cycle if r is the least number s such that the basic formula 
‘tf”(x) =x” belongs to it. A trivial l-type p is called exciting if for all d E D, 
“f(x) = d” $ p. A l-type p is called simple if for some simple type t, 8, EP. 
Finally, a basic l-type p is called semitrivial if for some d E D and k c n, 
“x = f k(d)” EP. 
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Let T(n, m) denote the number of basic l-types on {aI, . . . , a,}. We have 
T(n, m) C 2”“s”’ (observe that the occurrence of the formulas ‘If”(x) =f’(x)” and 
‘tf”(X) =f$z)” in a basic l-type and the occurrence of formulas 0, in it are 
dependent). Let us denote 
M’(rr, m) = 2n T(n, m)((n - l)t(n, m) + 2n) and 
M(n, m) = max(M’(n, m), (n - l)“(n + m) + 1). 
By a code we mean a m + 5tuple (D, dI, . . . , d,,,, P, Q, F, f*) which satisfies 
the following conditions: 
0. card(D) s M(n, m). 
1. dl, . . . , d,,, are pairwise distinct elements of D. 
2. P is a set of basic l-types on D such that the following conditions are 
satisfied: 
- for each d E D and I s IZ there is p E P which contains a formula “x =f’(d)“; 
- if p E P is subtrivial but not trivial, then for some d E D “f(x) = d” EP; 
- if p E P is not trivial and t is ramifying, then 8, $p; 
- if p E P is exciting, then the following conditions are satisfied: 
- for simple type t, Of Ep, 
- for all initial and ramifying in wider sense types t, 8, $p, 
- for every d E D and k = 1, . . . , n, “fk(x) = d” $p; 
- if p E P is not trivial and for some type t, 8, EP, then there is a trivial l-type 
pr such that 8, EP’; 
- if for some r = 1, . . . , n there is an r-cycle in P which is not trivial, then the 
set {d E D: a trivial type p such that “x = d” EP is an r-cycle} has at least n 
elements; 
- the set of sentences { a(~,): a(x) EP E P}, where {c,: p E P} is a set of new 
distinct constants, is consistent. 
3. Q G {p E P: p is subtrivial and not trivial}. 
4. F is a function from Q to (0, . . . , n - l}. 
5. f* is a partial function from P to P such that {p:p is trivial or 
subtrivial} E Dom(f*) and the following conditions are satisfied: 
- if for some d E D, “f(x) = d” EP, then f*(p) is defined and equal to the 
trivial type containing the basic formula “x = d”; 
- for p #p’, if f *(p) =p’ andp’ is not trivial, then for some k <n and d E D, 
“x = fk(d)” EP and “x = fkfl(d)” EP’. 
Let %=(A,a,,. . . ,a,, f) be a structure of the form (4) and let c = 
(D,d,,..., d,, P, Q, F, f *) be a code. As follows from the definition of code, 
for each d E D there is exactly one l-type p E P such that p contains a formula 
“x = d”. We will denote this l-type byp,. Let 6 be the function defined for d E D 
as follows: 6(d) =pd. We say that $2 admits c if there exists a function E from P to 
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A such that the following conditions are satisfied, where E and 6 denote also the 
induced translations of a basic l-type: 
1. {p:p is a basic l-type on ES(D) realized in %?l} = &6(P). 
2. Each p E ES(Q) is realized exactly F(6-‘(E-‘(P))) times in 8. Each 
subtrivial but not trivial l-type on &i(D) belonging to GS(P - Q) is realized at 
least n times in 2L 
3. Ef*E-’ Cf f-l (E(p))*. 
4. For each p E P, E(P) realizes d(p) in ‘21. 
Lemma 9. For every structure ‘u = (A, a,, . . . , a,,, f) there is a function g and a 
code c such that if ‘8 = (A, a,, . . . , a,, g), then TYPn@l) =TYP”@) and $23 
admits c. 
Proof. In the case card(A) s M(n, m) we take f = g, D =A and fE = f. The 
other elements of the code are determined in a natural way. 
Assume now card(A) > M(n, m). We consider all basic l-types on the set 
{al, . . . , a,,,} realized in 5X. For each such l-type we choose as many elements 
realizing it as possible, up to maximum n. Moreover, with each chosen element 
we choose also all ‘associated’ elements. For example, if the chosen element a 
realizes a 1-typep such that f3, EP, then we also choose elements b2, . . . , b, such 
that tV’(a, bZ, . . . , b,) = t. The procedure of choosing goes step by step. First we 
choose elements realizing trivial and subtrivial l-types. Then we choose elements 
realizing cycles. Finally, we choose elements which realize other l-types. Let DO 
denote the set of elements chosen in such a way. Now for 1 G n we consider sets 
BI = {a E DO: f’(a) E Do} and C, = {a E Do: f (a) $ Do and for some k < I, f“(a) = 
f’(a)} and for each a E B, U C, we extend DO by adding elements 
f(a), . . . , f’-‘(a). We repeat this as many times as possible. Let D be the set 
which arises in this way. The function g on the set D tl f -l(D) will coincide with 
f. We have to define the function g on the other elements. First assume that D is 
closed under the function f. We will consider some cases. 
Case 1: there is a simple l-type realized in 91. If A is finite, we define g on 
A - D putting g(d,) = d,,, for i = 1, . . . , s - 1 and f (dS) = dl where dl, . . . , d, is 
a one-one sequence of all elements of A - D. If A is infinite, then we define g in 
such a way that the graph of this function on A - D is a disjoint union of infinite 
chains. 
Case 2: the first case does not hold and some l-type being a cycle is realized in 
A - D. In this case we define g on A - D in such a way that the graph of g will be 
a union of such cycles. This can only not be possible in the case that A is finite. 
But in that case some element of A - D must realize a ramifying l-type being a 
cycle. Thus using less than n times the graph of the following form 
/ 
.+. . . . . 
s-e 2 
\ .-.. . . ./” 
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and adding it to the set D we can define g on the remaining elements as needed. 
Case 3: if the above cases do not hold, then there is a EA such that f-‘({a}) 
has at least 12 elements (here we use card(A) 2 M(n, m) > (n - l)“(n + m)). 
Thus, such an element belongs to D; let it be b. Then we define g by putting 
g(x)=bforallxEA-D. 
Assume now that f(D) is not contained in D. Then some simple l-type is 
realized in ‘u. If 9l is infinite, then we define g in such a way that its graph on 
A - D is a disjoint union of infinite chains. Similarly, for each a E D for which g 
is not defined we extend the definition g in such a way that the set {g’(u): I > 0} 
is infinite and disjoint with D. Let us consider the case %?I is finite. For each 
a E D such that f(u) $ D we have two possibilities: 
- for some k > n, f”(u) E D and for all I < k, f’(u) 4 D; 
- for some I > IZ and k, f”(u) =f’(u) and for all 1, f’(u) $ D. 
In the first case we take b,, . . . , b, E A - D and put g(u) = b,, g(b,) = b,+l 
and g(b,) =fk(u) and extend the set D adding elements bI, . . . , b,. In the 
second case we take b,, . . . , b, EA - D and put g(u) = bI, g(b,) = bi+l and 
g(b,) = b, where s = min(n, k) and r = s + min(n + 1, 1 - k). Similarly, we extend 
the set D by adding elements b, , . . . , b,. In this way g is defined on D (now 
extended) such that g(D) E D. On the set A - D the function g is defined in such 
a way that its graph forms a large circle. This finishes the definition of g and at the 
same time of %. 
Now we define a code c = (D, d,, . . . , d,, PI, P2, E, F,f,). The set D was 
determined in the construction of 58. An easy calculation shows that card(D) G 
M(n, m). For i = 1, . . . , m, dj = uj. P is the set of all l-types on D realized in rx3. 
By our construction condition 2 in the definition of code is satisfied. Q is the set 
of all subtrivial but not trivial l-types on D which are realized in ‘x3 not more than 
rr - 1 times. F is a function saying how many times a given l-type from Q is 
realized. Let 6 be the function defined before the definition of admittance. Thus 
f* is such that f* n (c~(D))~ = S(g rl D2). On the other elements we define f* 
where possible according to condition 5 in the definition of code. Finally by an 
easy argument we show that 5I_3 admits a code. 0 
Let a code c = (D, d,, . . . , d,, P, Q, F,f*) be given. Let k be the number of 
exciting basic l-types in P. Let {pi: i G s} be the set of all basic l-types which are 
neither trivial nor semitrivial and do not belong to Q. Finally let Q = {qi: i s r}. 
For such a code c we define the following sentence @=: 
where $9 is the formula 
+ card(D) + o . k = card(A)] A ZbO Ai > II 
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and #i is the formula 
a j-cycle} is divisible by j or infinite . 
Lemma 11. Zf W = (A, al, . . . , a,) is such that ‘2I- b @,, then there is a function f 
such that ‘?I = (‘K, f) admits c. 
Proof. Let ilo, . . . , A, be cardinal numbers witnessing that & is true in ‘u-. By 
#z we can assume that 
A=l_lA;UBUUC;UD 
i<r iss 
where all sets Ao, . . . , A,, B, Co, . . . , C,, D are pairwise disjoint, and such that 
card(q) = F(q,), card(C;) = Ai and card(B) = o * k. First we define the function f 
on the set D according to trivial types. If k f 0, then we use the set B for defining 
f in such a way that B = {f’(d): pd is exciting and 1> 0} and for each exciting pd 
the set {f’(d): 1 E w} is infinite. For a E Aj we put f(u) = d where d E D is such 
that “f(x) = d” E qie In the same way we define f on Ai if pi is subtrivial. If pi is an 
r-cycle for some r s n, then we define f on Ai in such a way that for all a E Ai, 
{f’(a): I > 0} has exactly r elements. By $i this is possible. Finally, if pi is a 
simple l-type and Ai is infinite, then we define f such that its graph is a disjoint 
union of infinite chains. In the case Ai is finite we define f such that for arbitrary 
a E Ai, {f’(u): 1 s hi} = Ai. This finishes the definition off. 
To show that ‘8 admits c we define E in a natural way (i.e., E(Pd) = d, 
&(pi) E Ai, &(q;) E Ci and for semitrivial but not trivial p, E(P) = f’(d) where 1 
and d are such that “x = f’(d)” EP). 0 
Lemma 12. Zf ‘8 admits the code c, then TYP”(%) can be effectively determined 
f rom c. 
Proof. A type t determines some directed graph G, having at most 2n elements. 
On the other hand a code determines also some finite graph G, - the graph of 
the function f restricted to D. To decide if a type t belongs to TYP”(%) we must 
verify if the graph G, is a subgraph of the graph G,. Such a verification is 
effective. 0 
By the last lemma it makes sense to write TYP”(c). 
A basic sentence is a sentence of the form 
card(A) 2 w A @ or card(A) < o A v(card(A)) 
where @ is a sentence and q(x) is a formula of the language of arithmetic with 
addition. 
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Lemma 13. For every code c there is a disjunction of basic sentences which is 
equivalent to eC. 
Proof The sentence @= is equivalent to the following sentence 
[card(A) < o A 3Ao. . . A, @‘(card(A))] 
where the disjunction VR 3Ai,, * . . A, c$gFR is taken over all possible orderings R of 
the set (s + 1) - {iO, . . . , i,}, @‘(card(A)) is the formula @: A @r in which 
A 0, . . . > A, are free variables, and $‘k,R arises from @z A #A by interpreting 
Ai,,, . . . j A, as number variables and the others as fixed cardinal numbers ordered 
with respect to their value by the relation R. Here we only use that the sum of the 
infinite cardinal numbers is equal to the largest one. This gives us the required 
disjunction of the basic sentences. Cl 
Theorem 7. The theory of equality in L(F,) is decidable. 
Proof. We will show that each sentence is effectively equivalent to some boolean 
combination of basic sentences. We construct it by elimination of quantifiers. It is 
enough to show that if $ is a boolean combination of atomic formulas and basic 
sentences, then the formula Fnx, . . . x,y, . . * y, C#J is equivalent to some boolean 
combination of atomic formulas and basic sentences. We can assume that # has 
the form Vi Aj $i, where each Gij is an atomic formula or negation of an atomic 
formula or a basic sentence. In a standard way (see Krynicki-Lachlan [9, p. 1931) 
we can ‘eliminate’ basic sentences and atomic formulas not containing the 
variables x1, . . . , x,, yl, . . . , yn. In effect, we can assume that the free variables 
of $ are x1, . . . , x,, y,, . . . , y,, z,, . . . , z,. Moreover, in each part of the 
disjunction there is a conjunction Ai+, zi # Zj. Now we proceed as in the proof 
of Fact 2.6 in Krynicki-Lachlan [9]. Each type t of n elements is characterized by 
a quantifier-free formula &. We can assume that for each t, & implies 
Ai~jzi #z,. We denote TYP”($) = {t: & implies @}. Let C = {c: c is a code and 
TYP”(c) ETYP~($)}. By Lemmas 10 and 11 for arbitrary A and pairwise 
different elements a,, . . . , a, of A we have: 
(A,a,,...,a,)~F,x,...y,~[a,,...,a,l iff (A,Q~,...,~,)~~~,&. 
By Lemma 13, Vcpc & is equivalent to a disjunction of basic sentences. This 
finishes the proof of Theorem 7. 0 
Corollary 1. The theory of equality in L(F,) is decidable. 
The last two results allow us to give a partial answer to the question stated in 
Krynicki-Vaananen [lo]. Namely, by Corollary 1 and Theorem 1 we have: 
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Corollary 2. (a) L(F,) is not recursively semantically equivalent to L(H,). 
(b) L(F,) is nof recursively semantically equivalent to L(FfJ. 
(c) L(F,) is not recursively semantically equivalent to L*. 
Finally we can deduce the following result implicitly contained in Krynicki- 
Vaananen [lo]. 
Corollary 3. The Hanf and Skolem numbers for the theory of equality in L(F,), as 
well as in L(F,), are w. 
From the proof of the main theorem we can also deduce the following 
corollary. 
Corollary 4. Each sentence of the theory of equality in L(F,) is equivalent to a 
sentence of the form 
card(A) 2 o v (card(A) < o A W(card(A))) 
where q(x) is a disjunction of the conjunctions of the following formulas: x < i, 
j <x, x = k, x = m (mod n). Moreover, this sentence can be found in an effective 
way. 
Let D, be a divisibility quantifier whose semantical meaning is defined as 
follows: 
D,x @ iff card({x: @(x)} is divisible by 12 or infinite. 
The quantifier D, is definable by the quantifier F,. Let L(D,) denote the logic 
with divisibility quantifiers D, for all n E W. An analysis of the proof of Theorem 7 
and some simple number-theoretic facts allows us to prove (see also Mostowski 
[15]) the following corollary. 
Corollary 5. (a) The theory of equality in L(F,) and the theory of equality in 
L(D,) are recursively equivalent (i.e., for every formula of the theory of equality 
in L(F,) there can effectively be found a semantically equivalent formula of the 
theory of equality in L(D,)). 
(b) The theory of equality in L(F,) is recursively semantically equivalent to the 
theory of equality in L(Dk)ksn. 
3. Some other theories 
3.1. General lemma 
In this section we extend some results of Krynicki-Lachlan [9] concerning 
decidability and undecidability of theories in L(H). In that paper it was proved 
that the theory of unary relations is decidable in L(H). On the other hand the 
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theory of successor functions is undecidable in L(F,). The proof of this fact is 
based on the observation that in (w, s), where s is the usual successor function, 
we can define addition and multiplication. This allows us also to prove the 
following lemma, suggested by A.H. Lachlan: 
Lemma 14. Let us assume that there is a formula #(x, y) and a model ‘%!I for T 
such that for any n E o there is b E 131 such that there is a finite number, but more 
than n, of elements a E )‘%I for which +(a, b) holds in ‘?I. Then T is undecidable in 
L(F,). 
Proof. Let C#I be a formula satisfying the assumptions of the lemma. We define: 
U(x) iff (2: c+(z, x)} is finite, 
R(x, y) iff card{z: c$(z, x)} = card{z: +(z, y)}, 
S(x, y) iff card{z: $(z, x)} < card{z: c$(z, y)}. 
Notice that U(x) is expressible in L(F,) (this can be done by means of the 
Ehrenfeucht sentence restricted to a proper formula). R(x, y) and S(x, y) are 
also expressible in L(F,) (see, e.g., Krynicki-Lachlan [9]). We denote by o the 
sentence 3x U(x) A Vx 3y (U(x) + U(y) A S(x, y)), and T’ = T U {a}. By our 
assumption T’ is consistent. Moreover, if % is a model for T’, then we have 
(U”/R‘“, S”‘/R”‘) = (0, <). N ow, as in Krynicki-Lachlan [9, Lemma 3.21, we can 
show that addition and multiplication are categorically definable. Thus T’ and 
consequently T is undecidable in L(F,). 0 
Corollary 6. The following theories are undecidable in L(F,): 
- the theory of one unary function, 
- the theory of boolean algebras, 
- the theory of ordered groups, 
- the theory of archimedian order groups. 
Proof. We apply Lemma 14 using the formula y = f (x) in the first case, “x is an 
atom and x G y” in the second case, and 0 < x A x < y in the last two cases. 0 
Some results from the last corollary can be obtained using the undecidability of 
the considered theories in the language with the Hartig quantifier (see Herre et 
al. [7]). 
3.2. Group theory 
Now we consider the theory of groups. First we define the following formula: 
~(x,y)=1F2uVzt[(u=e~z=e)/\(u=v+y=$z=t+y)r\(u=xjz#x)], 
where e denotes the neutral element of a group. 
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Lemma 15. For every group %?I = (G, +, 0) and a, b E G we have % k #(a, b) if 
and only if there is n E Z such that a = nb. 
Proof. (c$) Let us assume that ‘21 Ll@(a, b). Then there is a function f : G+ G 
such that f (0) = 0, and for every g E G, f (g + b) = f (g) + b. Thus for every n E Z, 
f (nb) = nb. But f (a) # a so there is no n E Z such that a = nb. 
(3) Let us assume that a # nb for any n E Z. We define f : G += G step by step 
in the following way. First we put f (nb) = nb for all n E Z. Now let f be defined 
on H being the proper subset of G such that for all x E H and n E Z, x + nb E H. 
Now let x E G - H. We extend f by putting f (x + nb) = nb for each n E 72. This 
shows that ?I k-@(a, b). 0 
Corollary 7. The following notions are expressible in L(F,): 
- G is a cyclic group. 
- G is a torsion-free group. 
- G has an element of infinite order. 
-An element x is of finite order. 
-An element x is a generator of a group G. 
Proof. By Lemma 15 each of these sentences can be expressed using the formula 
4. 0 
Theorem 8. Every extension of the theory of groups having a model with an 
element of infinite order is undecidable in L(F,). 
Proof. Let T be a theory satisfying the assumptions of the theorem. Let 
T’ = T U { 3y 0,x (x, y)} , where Q, is the quantifier ‘there exist infinitely many’ 
and @ is the formula defined before Lemma 15. Thus T’ is consistent. Let c be a 
new constant and let T, = T’ U {Q-x $(x, c)}. We define: 
U(x) = 44% c), S(x,y)=y=x+c, 
U+(x) = U(x) A F ,uzvt((u=zev=t)A(u=ojv=o)A(u#oAU(u) 
+(V=U+CVV+C=U))A(V=Z+(U#tVU=0))A(U=XjV=U+C)). 
By our assumptions U(x) and S(x, y) define a structure isomorphic to the integers 
with successor function. U’(x) is satisfied if U(x) and there is a one-one function 
f such that f (0) = 0, f oranyy#Ofrom Ueitherf(y)=y+corf(y)=y-c, for 
no y # 0 f(y) = y, and moreover f(x) = x + c. Therefore U+ defines the positive 
part of U. Hence in any model for T,, U+(x) and S(x, y) define a system 
isomorphic to (w, s). Thus T, and consequently T are undecidable. 0 
The last theorem gives us many examples of undecidable theories in L(F,): the 
theory of abelian groups, the theory of cyclic groups, the theory of free torsion 
groups etc. 
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Let us turn to the case of the theory of groups with all elements of finite order. 
Here we can prove the following: 
Theorem 9. Every theory of groups having a model with elements of arbitrary 
large finite order is undecidable in L( F2). 
Proof. Using the formula $(x, y) we can define the relation “the order of an 
element . . . is less than the order of an element . . .” between elements of finite 
order. This allows us to interpret (w, <) in a model of our theory. 0 
In Baudisch [l] it was proved that the theory of p-adic groups in the language 
with the Hlrtig quantifier is decidable. In spite of this we obtain the following 
corollary. 
Corollary 8. The theory of p-adic groups is undecidable in L(F,). 
3.3. The theory of fields 
The same method as in the case of the theory of groups can be applied to many 
theories of fields. Let o, be the formula 0,x $(x, 1) and o2 the formula 
VX 3y ($(y, 1) &X < y) where C$ is the formula defined before Lemma 15. 
Lemma 16. (a) For an arbitrary field K we have 
K k o1 iff K is of characteristic 0. 
(b) For arbitrary ordered field K we have 
K 1 a, iff K is an archimedian ordered field. 
Theorem 10. Each extension of the theory offields having as a model some field of 
characteristic 0 is undecidable in L(F,). 
Proof. The idea is the same as in the proof of Theorem 8. The difference is that 
we use the constant 1 instead of the parameter c. 0 
Thus again we obtain several examples of undecidable theories, for instance: 
the theory of fields, the theory of real closed fields, the theory of algebraic closed 
fields etc. 
3.4. The theory of one equivalence relation 
Now let us consider the theory of one equivalence relation in L(F,). We can 
prove the following: 
Theorem 11. If T is an extension of the theory of one equivalence relation having 
a model in which there are infinitely many equivalence classes of distinct power, 
then T is undecidable in L(F,). 
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Proof. Using the definability of the Hartig quantifier in L(F,), we can in a 
standard way interpret the theory of (w, <) in T. This gives us the undecidability 
ofT. 0 
As a complement to the last theorem we give: 
Remark. A theory of one equivalence relation having at most n equivalence 
classes is decidable in L(H) and hence in L(F,). 
Proof. It is easy to see that such a theory is interpretable in the theory of unary 
relations. •! 
3.5. The theory of infinitely many monadic predicates 
Until now we have considered Henkin quantifiers of the form Hf, only. The 
question whether the restriction to such quantifiers is essential remains open. 
However, we know by Theorem 1 that every quantifier Hk can be expressed using 
identity in infinite domains by means of a quantifier HL (for suitable m). By the 
monadic logic of a logic L we mean the theory of infinitely many unary relations 
with identity in the logic L. In [9] it was shown that the monadic logic of L(H) is 
decidable. Here we shall prove that it is not so in the case of L(Hi). Actually we 
will prove a stronger theorem for F:. 
Theorem 12. The monadic logic of L(Fz) is undecidable. 
Proof. It was shown by MatijaseviE [ll] that: “there is no algorithm for 
determining whether an arbitrary diophantine equation has a solution”. From this 
follows the undecidability of the set of true existential statements about natural 
numbers built up using constant 0, operations s, +, *, and identity symbols =. 
Reducing the truth problem for such statements to the tautology problem for the 
monadic logic of L(Fz), we can show that the monadic logic of L(F:) is 
undecidable. 
Let # be the statement 3x, . . . 3x, cu(xl, . . . , x,), where (u(x,, . . . , x,) is a 
quantifier-free formula built up using constant 0, operations s, +, *, and identity 
symbol =, with no other variables than xi, . . . , x,. First we translate the formula 
4.6, *. . 7 x,) into a statement in the monadic language with F$. The idea of the 
translation is as follows: a numerical variable xi will be represented by a predicate 
e, a value of xi will be represented by a number of elements satisfying 4.; all 
numerical relations between x1, . . . , x, will be represented by corresponding 
numerical relations between powers of PI, . . . , P,; at the end we join the 
obtained statement into conjunction with the Ehrenfeucht statement saying that 
the universe is finite. In this way we obtain a sentence @* in the monadic 
language with Fz, such that @ is true if and only if #* has a model (which has to 
be finite). 
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It remains to define the translation. We assume that Q$x,, . . . , x,) is a boolean 
combination of atomic formulas: xi = Xi, xi = 0, xi = s(xj), xi = xi + xk, xi = xi . xk. 
We can obtain a formula satisfying this assumption in an effective way from @ 
increasing eventually the number of existential quantifiers. Then we define the 
translation for atomic formulas. We shall give a translation into second-order 
logic, keeping in mind that all second-order quantifiers can be eliminated in 
favour of F$. Let L3: (@(x, jj), $(x, 2)) be the abbreviation of the following 
formula 
3f Vx Vx’ [(@(x7 Y)_ W@-(x), 3) * (V(% 2) e @(f(x), Y)) 
A ((f(x) =f(x’)) *x =x’)l. 
xi = xi is replaced by 
L\: (L?(X)> 4(x)). 
xi = 0 is replaced by 
vx lC(X). 
xi = s(xj) is replaced by 
32 e(z) A Lx (e(x) A x # 2, 4(x)). 
xi = xi + xk is replaced by 
Lx (4(x), 4(x) ” &(x)). 
xi = xi . xk is replaced by 
3fVx VX Vy Vy’ [(L+) A 4(y) A 4(x’) A MY’) Af(x, x’) =f(y, Y’) 
* (x = y A x’ = Y ‘1) A (W(x, x’)) e (q(x) * W’)))I 
Al32 3f vx Vx’ vy Vy’ [(C(x) A q(y) A P,(x’) A P,(y’) Af(X, x’) =f(y, y’) 
*(x = y A x’ = y’) A (S(f(x, x’))e (q(x) A P/Jx’))) A C(z) A z #f(x, x’)]. 
For the adequacy of this translation (particularly in the case of addition) we 
have to guarantee the disjointness of e and 4 for i fj. Then we define the effect 
of the translation as the conjunction of the formula obtained by the above 
replacements and the formula being the conjunction of formulas Vx l(S(x) A 
P;(x)), for i, i such that i #i and Pi, Pj occurring in the translated formula. 0 
Theorem W. The theory of infinitely many unary relations in L(H,) is 
undecidable. 
Proof. By the proof of the previous theorem it suffices to define a translation for 
xi =xj ‘xk, that is a formula saying that the number of x satisfying Pi(X) is equal 
to the number of x satisfying q(x) multiplied by the number of x satisfying P&). 
We use the property that card(X) c card(Y x Z) if and only if there are 
projections f : X +Y, g:X-,Z, such that for x,yeX:x=y if and only if 
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f(x) =f(y) A g(x) =g(Y). If x VJ 2) is the set of elements satisfying 
@J(X) (v(x), x(x) respectively), then this property can be expressed by the 
following formula, denoted by @(#(x), ~/J(X), X(X)): 
3f 3f’ 3g 3g’ vx Vx’ vy Vy’ 
((44x) A w> 3 (x =x’ -f (xl =f ‘W)) A Hf (x))) 
~(d’(Y)“d’(Y’)~(Y=Y’~Jg(Y)=~‘(Y’))”X(~(Y))) 
“(d’(X)“@(Y)+‘((x=Y-(f(x)=f’(Y)“&)=d(Y))))). 
The above formula can easily be formulated in L(H,). The translation of the 
formula Xi = Xi * Xk will be the following formula @(e(x), q(x), Pk(x)) A 
VY (@(e(x) v x = Y9 4(Y), P/c(x)) * e(Y)). 0 
4. Final remarks 
In this part we would like to discuss some unsolved problems and list some 
open questions. 
1. We have proved that the theory of identity in L(H,) is undecidable. It 
implies that this theory in a language with all Henkin quantifiers L” is also 
undecidable, but we do not know if the language with all Henkin quantifiers is 
semantically more powerful than that of L(H,), that is if L* # L(H,). It seems 
that L(H,) is essentially weaker than L”. However there are Henkin quantifiers 
which seem to be weaker than those of the form H,, they are 




More generally, if A is an infinite class of nonlinear Henkin quantifiers then: what 
is the relation between L(A), L(H,), and L*? 
2. All undecidability results for the theory of identity stated in this paper, 
particularly for L(H,), essentially use the fact that the considered class of 
quantifiers are infinite. This does not exclude the possibility that the theory of 
identity in L(H,) is decidable for all 12 (for n = 2 this was proved in [9]). If for 
some 12 the theory of identity in L(H,) is undecidable, then there is the question 
of the minimal II with this property. A relevant result about unprovability of 
decidability of the theory of identity in L(Q), has been stated in [13], but it is not 
obvious how to conclude just undecidability from that. 
3. Let u be a signature with infinitely many unary predicates. We know that 
L,(H) is decidable, but L,(H,) and L,(Fz) are undecidable. What about Lo(H3)? 
What is the situation if (T were finite? And finally, is L,(F,) decidable? 
4. For languages as powerful as the language with all Henkin quantifiers the 
borderline between axiomatizable (recursively enumerable) and not axiomatiz- 
able seems to be more interesting than that between decidable and undecidable. 
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In [14], it was stated that for every recursive set of Henkin quantifiers A if the 
theory of identity in L(A) is axiomatizable, then it is decidable. Does the same 
hold for every signature? For a signature o with at least one binary predicate or 
one unary function symbol L,(H) is not recursively enumerable because full 
elementary arithmetic can be interpreted in L,(H) (see [9]). We know that every 
nonlinear Henkin quantifier has to contain H, therefore the problem is reduced 
to the question: are there any decidable classes of Henkin quantifiers A such that 
the theory of unary relations in L(A) is recursively enumerable but undecidable? 
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